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Against an international backdrop of persistent strains in the euro area, growth in the Latin 
American economy continued to move on the gradually slowing path on which it had em-
barked in 2011, following a brief hiatus in Q1. Thus, GDP growth for the seven major 
economies in the region1  averaged 2.6% in 2012 Q2 in year-on-year terms, almost 1 pp 
lower than at the close of 2011, representing the lowest growth since the exit from the 
crisis in 2009. In quarterly terms, the slowdown was seen mainly in Q2 (0.5%), since 
growth in Q1 (0.9%) was slightly better than that for the second half of 2011. These devel-
opments point to a regional “soft landing” scenario, with growth easing more than was 
expected at the beginning of the year, although moving similarly to that in other emerging 
economies, and centred especially on two countries, Argentina and Brazil (see Chart 1).
In these two economies, growth eased due mainly to the weakness of domestic demand, 
in particular of gross capital formation. In Brazil, weak investment in capital goods, in step 
with the prolonged sluggishness of the industrial sector, was attributable to structural fac-
tors and the delayed effects of the appreciation of the exchange rate. Meanwhile, in Argen-
tina, investment in capital goods and construction has been affected in recent months by 
foreign exchange controls and restrictions on imports. Conversely, in the other countries 
the growth rates of GDP and domestic demand were notably sounder, but external de-
mand weakened across the board, marking a significant difference on the previous year. 
These weak exports are a sign that the slowdown in the region’s major trading partners, 
which brought about a marked deceleration in international trade (see Chart 1), the drop in 
the price of some of the main export commodities of countries in the region (oil and metals) 
and, to a lesser degree, the increase in volatility on financial markets, have had a consider-
able impact on economic developments in Latin America in recent months.
Conversely, consumer prices have scarcely changed in the past six months. Average infla-
tion for the region stood in September at 6.2% year-on-year, unchanged on March, and 
displaying some downward stickiness despite the economic slowdown. Inflation expecta-
tions remained stable or even slightly on the upside in some countries, and in most coun-
tries with inflation targets they were in the upper limit of the tolerance band. In Brazil, infla-
tion stabilised at above 5% year-on-year, 0.5 pp up on the official target, but that did not 
interrupt the pronounced cycle of cuts in benchmark interest rates, to a historical low of 
7.25%, in a setting in which fiscal policy and other financial measures added fresh stimulus. 
Among the other countries, only Colombia joined the downward cycle in interest rates in 
July and August.
In short, although the economic fundamentals of most of the economies in the region re-
main relatively sound and domestic demand continues to be buoyant (with the odd nota-
ble exception such as Brazil and Argentina), the worsening external environment has sig-
nificantly affected the region, especially via the trade channel. External risks have thus 
been a constant, although the most serious ones, relating to a possible spread of the euro 
area sovereign crisis to growth in the world economy (and indirectly to Latin America through 
the trade, financial and confidence channels), appeared to have slackened following the 
initiatives announced by the European authorities since the start of the summer. Meanwhile, 
Introduction
1  Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 38 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, OCTOBER 2012 REPORT ON THE LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMY. SECOND HALF OF 2012
the main central banks of the developed economies broadened their range of non-conven-
tional measures to support growth, which should prove positive for the emerging econo-
mies – the Latin American countries among them - as a whole. That said, the measures 
might ultimately accentuate the monetary policy dilemmas in some of them.  Accordingly, 
although the latest indicators point to some recovery, especially among the Latin American 
countries whose performance has recently been poor, economic policies are generally be-
ing pursued in a setting of high uncertainty over the global recovery; further, the fact a 
number of countries in the region are running current-account deficits means a note of 
caution is warranted (see Table 1).
In recent months, worldwide economic and financial developments have continued to be 
influenced by the unfolding of the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area. The worsening of 
the crisis in the spring, which was accompanied by a fairly geographically widespread 
slowdown in activity (see Chart 2), prompted a rise in risk aversion, which translated into 
further episodes of flight to quality and into stock market declines. Since the start of the 
summer, measures taken by the main developed economies’ central banks have contrib-
uted to shaping a somewhat paradoxical international economic picture. While financial 
markets recovered substantially, on the back of the reduction in the risks of extreme events 
in the euro area and the increase in the appetite for risk against a background of ample 
liquidity, economic activity remained markedly weak, and the growth outlook for the glob-
al economy, including the emerging economies, was revised downwards.
In the developed countries, after economic activity picked up somewhat in 2012 Q1, an 
across-the-board slowdown was discernible, more sharply so in certain economies such 
as Japan, the euro area and the United Kingdom, but also in the United States, where the 
labour market began to show signs of weakness again. Against this backdrop, and with 
inflation rates tending to ease owing to the lesser pressure of commodities prices, the 
central banks decided mid-year to implement new measures. Of note was the action by 
the ECB, which cut its official interest rate to 0.75% in July and announced its commitment 
to act to eliminate redenomination risk in the euro area. In September it approved the in-
troduction of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs), which envisage sovereign bond pur-
chases in the short-term — with a residual maturity up to three years — on the secondary 
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2012 2012
Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 September
GDP (year-on-year rate)
    Latin America (a) -1.9 6.3 4.4 6.1 5.4 5.5 4.3 4.4 3.6 3.3 2.6  
    Argentina (b) 0.9 9.2 8.9 8.6 9.2 9.9 9.1 9.3 7.3 5.2 0.0  
    Brazil -0.3 7.5 2.7 6.9 5.3 4.2 3.3 2.1 1.4 0.8 0.5  
    Mexico -6.2 5.5 3.9 5.4 4.4 4.4 3.1 4.3 3.9 4.5 4.1  
    Chile -1.0 6.1 6.0 7.7 6.7 9.9 6.3 3.7 4.5 5.3 5.5  
    Colombia (c) 1.7 4.0 5.9 3.0 4.7 5.0 5.1 7.5 6.1 4.7 4.9  
    Venezuela -3.2 -1.5 4.2 -0.2 0.5 4.8 2.6 4.4 4.9 5.8 5.4  
    Peru 0.9 8.8 6.9 9.6 9.2 8.8 6.9 6.7 5.5 6.0 6.1  
CPI (year-on-year rate)
    Latin America (a) 6.4 6.4 6.8 6.2 6.6 6.7 6.6 6.9 7.0 6.6 6.0 6.2
    Argentina (b) 6.3 10.5 9.8 11.1 11.0 10.1 9.7 9.8 9.6 9.7 9.9 10.0
    Brazil 4.9 5.0 6.6 4.6 5.6 6.1 6.6 7.1 6.7 5.8 5.0 5.3
    Mexico 5.3 4.2 3.4 3.7 4.2 3.5 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.9 3.9 4.8
    Chile 0.4 1.4 3.3 2.2 2.5 2.9 3.3 3.1 4.0 4.1 3.1 2.8
    Colombia 4.2 2.3 3.4 2.3 2.7 3.3 3.0 3.5 3.9 3.5 3.3 3.1
    Venezuela 28.6 29.0 27.2 29.8 27.3 29.1 24.6 26.5 28.5 25.1 22.3 19.1
    Peru 2.9 1.5 3.4 2.2 2.1 2.4 3.1 3.5 4.5 4.2 4.1 3.7
Budget balance (% of GDP) (d)
    Latin America (a) (e) -2.8 -2.2 -2.0 -2.0 -2.2 -1.8 -1.6 -1.7 -2.0 -2.1 -1.9
    Argentina -0.6 0.2 -1.6 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 -0.4 -1.6 -1.9 -1.7
    Brazil -3.3 -2.5 -2.6 -2.3 -2.5 -2.3 -2.1 -2.5 -2.6 -2.4 -2.6
    Mexico -2.3 -2.9 -2.5 -2.4 -2.7 -2.8 -2.8 -2.6 -2.4 -2.7 -2.5
    Chile -4.3 -0.3 1.5 0.0 -0.3 1.0 1.4 2.0 1.5 1.6 1.2
    Colombia -3.8 -3.6 -2.1 -3.6 -3.5 -2.9 -1.5 -1.4 -2.1 -2.5 -1.0
    Venezuela -5.1 -3.8 — -3.5 -3.8 — — — — — —
    Peru -1.7 0.1 0.9 -0.3 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.9 0.9 1.3 2.4
Public debt (% of GDP)
    Latin America (a) 34.5 33.4 32.1 33.5 33.1 33.0 32.9 32.3 32.1 31.3 —
    Argentina 47.9 44.6 40.1 46.1 44.6 44.8 42.9 40.8 40.2 — —
    Brazil 42.1 39.2 36.5 39.4 39.2 38.9 38.6 36.3 36.4 36.5 35.1
    Mexico 28.0 27.5 26.5 27.3 26.1 27.1 26.9 27.6 26.5 28.2 28.1
    Chile 5.8 8.6 11.2 8.7 9.2 9.0 9.4 10.6 11.2 11.2 11.7
    Colombia 35.0 35.0 33.7 34.7 34.7 35.0 33.2 34.1 33.8 33.3 32.8
    Venezuela 22.6 28.1 25.1 25.9 28.1 25.1 31.5 34.7 36.6 33.5 —
    Peru 27.3 23.4 21.7 23.2 23.4 22.4 21.7 20.9 21.7 20.7 20.0
Current account balance (% of GDP) (d)
    Latin America (a) -0.3 -0.7 -0.8 -0.6 -0.8 -0.9 -0.8 -0.8 -0.9 -0.7 -0.9
    Argentina 3.6 0.8 0.0 1.3 0.7 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
    Brazil -1.5 -2.2 -2.1 -2.3 -2.2 -2.2 -2.1 -2.0 -2.1 -2.0 -2.1
    Mexico -0.6 -0.3 -0.8 0.0 -0.3 -0.5 -0.5 -0.9 -0.8 -0.6 -0.5
    Chile 2.0 1.5 -1.3 1.6 1.9 0.8 0.6 -0.4 -1.3 -1.6 -2.7
    Colombia -2.1 -3.1 -3.0 -2.7 -3.1 -3.1 -3.2 -2.9 -3.0 -2.8 -3.1
    Venezuela 1.8 5.0 9.2 5.4 5.0 5.8 7.3 8.7 8.6 7.6 5.9
    Peru 0.2 -1.7 -1.3 -1.1 -1.7 -2.6 -2.9 -2.0 -1.9 -1.7 -2.0
External debt (% of GDP)
    Latin America (a) 20.6 20.9 19.9 20.4 20.7 20.6 19.9 19.9 19.9 20.0 —
    Argentina 37.6 35.0 31.6 34.4 32.4 34.1 28.4 31.1 30.6 32.8 —
    Brazil 12.2 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 12.3 12.2 12.0 12.0 12.1 16.5
    Mexico 18.9 19.0 18.2 18.4 19.0 17.8 18.6 18.0 18.2 18.4 19.1
    Chile 42.1 40.1 40.3 40.8 39.9 39.8 39.8 38.6 39.5 39.3 39.8
    Colombia 22.7 22.4 22.8 21.5 22.5 20.6 20.9 21.7 22.8 20.6 20.5
    Venezuela 22.6 35.5 36.4 33.8 38.8 36.5 36.0 35.2 33.9 31.1 —
    Peru 28.1 26.1 24.4 26.6 26.4 28.1 27.9 27.6 26.9 28.5 28.6
2011
20112009 2010
2010
LATIN AMERICA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS TABLE 1
SOURCE: National statistics.
a Aggregate of the seven countries represented.
b Of?cial ?gures.
c Seasonally adjusted.
d Four-quarter moving average.  
e As from 2010 Q4, the budget balance aggregate does not include Venezuela.
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market, in a discretionary manner, without quantitative limits and subject to strict condi-
tionality, which will require the country whose bonds are purchased to have previously 
requested assistance from the European mechanisms. The European Council in June also 
contributed to alleviating tensions by committing itself to deepening integration, in particu-
lar by pushing forward the European banking union.
Likewise, the US Federal Reserve announced a major set of measures in September: the 
start of a new quantitative easing programme (QE3) based on purchases of MBSs from 
agencies for an unlimited amount and over an unlimited period of time, and the extension 
of its commitment to keep official rates at their current levels until mid-2015, explicitly 
signalling that this will be the case even if the recovery has started. The Bank of England 
approved a new six-month liquidity facility, it extended its asset purchase programme and, 
along with the British government, launched a scheme aimed at boosting lending to the 
non-financial private sector. Finally, the Bank of Japan expanded the volume of its asset 
purchase programme at its April and September meetings. In the fiscal domain, fiscal 
consolidation continued to be intense in the European economies most closely scrutinised 
by the markets, while doubts grew over the medium- and long-term sustainability of public 
finances in Japan and the United States. Nonetheless, in the United States the main risk 
in the short run is of the opposite sign: the automatic activation of substantial fiscal cuts 
at the end of this year (the so-called fiscal cliff) which, if no political agreement is reached 
to avoid it, will have an effect on growth equivalent to several percentage points of GDP.
During this period, activity continued to slow progressively in the emerging economies. 
This was notably the case in China and India, where the slowdown was sharper than ex-
pected. These developments arose, with some cross-regional differences, due to the low-
er contribution from external demand and, in some cases, to the gradual weakening of 
domestic demand. The deepening of the euro area crisis had a notable impact on emerg-
ing economies through the commercial channel; the impact was sharper in European 
emerging countries with closer commercial and financial ties to the euro area and in econ-
omies such as China with a higher degree of trade openness (see Chart 2). Inflation gener-
ally tended to ease in the period analysed, although in Q3 increases in energy and some 
food prices – in the latter case due to poor harvests in various regions – prompted a slight 
rise in inflation rates. In this setting, some banks continued with the cycle of interest rates 
cuts, although this trend was far from widespread and, rather, a cautious attitude prevailed 
which was reflected in leaving the monetary policy stance unchanged. In the same vein, 
the sharper-than-anticipated slowdown favoured the approval of fiscal stimulus packages 
in some cases – mainly China.
In this context, international financial markets were influenced by the worsening outlook 
for economic growth and the ongoing strains of the European sovereign debt crisis. How-
ever, the measures introduced during the summer by the main advanced economies’ cen-
tral banks contributed to stabilising financial markets. They triggered gains in most stock 
market indices, a decrease in volatility, a reduction in corporate bond risk premia, some 
improvement in the government debt markets of ailing European countries and a slight 
appreciation of the euro against the dollar. Commodities prices fluctuated somewhat and 
a pattern of declines predominated in Q2 which was corrected from end-June, especially 
in the case of oil and certain metals.
The recovery in financial markets in the early months of 2012, following the bout of insta-
bility in 2011 Q4 linked to uncertainty about the unfolding of the Greek crisis, did not firm. 
In 2012 Q2, emerging markets were once again affected by uncertainty concerning the 
Financial markets 
and external financing
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sustainability of Spain and Italy’s public debt and the future of the euro project. This was 
reflected both in terms of financial asset prices – with stock market declines, widening 
sovereign spreads and exchange rate depreciations – and in terms of volumes – capital 
outflows from stock markets and the lower pace of fixed-income issuance on interna-
tional markets together with slightly tighter issuance conditions (see Chart 2). However, 
this episode of tension was relatively short-lived with the result that from end-May emerg-
ing markets began to pick up again and in some cases reached their pre-summer 2011 
levels. Subsequently, as mentioned above, the monetary policy measures adopted in de-
veloped countries lent further support to these markets. Investors returned to the stock 
markets, especially to debt, and issuance on primary markets recovered, resulting in a 
higher volume being placed in emerging markets between January and October than in the 
same period in 2010, marking an all-time record (see Chart 2).
Developments in Latin American financial markets in the last six months paralleled those 
in other emerging markets and were determined to a greater degree by global factors than 
by country-specific events. Between April and May sovereign spreads as measured by the 
EMBI climbed by almost 100 bp and at the height of the tension stood at around 480 bp 
(Chart 2). The sovereign spreads of Argentina and Venezuela deteriorated most (widening 
by 275 bp and 260 bp, respectively). In the case of the former, they were affected by cer-
tain government measures to control supply and demand for dollars and, in the case of the 
latter, they were impacted by the uncertainty surrounding the presidential elections in Oc-
tober. In Chile, conversely, the widening of the spread was limited to 45 bp whereas in 
Brazil, Mexico, Colombia and Peru it was close to 65 bp.
Since Latin America’s exposure to financial flows (direct investment and foreign banks’ 
capital) from the countries impacted most by the euro crisis, particularly, Spain, is higher 
than that of other emerging regions, Latin American markets were expected to have been 
affected more directly and sharply than other markets (see Box 1). However, the reaction 
of sovereign spreads and stock markets was not more intense than that in other emerging 
economies and was more moderate than that in previous bouts of global tension (see 
Chart 3). This greater resilience has arisen, furthermore, against a backdrop of a poorer 
outlook for Latin America’s main trading partners, notably China, and of continued low 
growth expectations in the United States, suggesting that it is the improvement in the re-
gion’s own economic and financial fundamentals that is supporting this increased autono-
my. In this setting the rating agencies’ ratings have improved by one notch since the end 
of last year for the aggregate of Latin America, even taking into account Argentina and 
Venezuela. Five-year sovereign CDS appear to have an implied rating, obtained through a 
panel with all the available countries2 in the A- category (see Chart 3), approximately three 
notches above that given by the agencies and, at certain points in 2012 Q2, even above 
the aggregate for the euro area.
Between April and March, the Latin American stock market posted a decline of more 
than 21%, measured in dollars, higher than that in Asia but slightly lower than that in 
Eastern Europe. Accordingly, the region’s exchange rates depreciated sharply, espe-
cially those of the economies with higher interest rates and more liquid markets which 
enhance the appeal of carry trade operations, such as Mexico (-8.8%) and Brazil (-5.5%) 
(see Chart 3). The tensions in global financial markets were reflected in a sharp drop in 
total capital inflows into Latin America in 2012 Q2 (see Chart 4) to levels similar to those 
2  Implied ratings calculated by exponential regression in respect of Standard and Poor’s sovereign ratings trans-
formed using the linear scale (21=AAA to 0=D/SD) and the listed premia for five-year sovereign CDS.
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BOX 1CROSS-BORDER BANK FLOWS TO LATIN AMERICA
The world’s main banking systems underwent strong international 
expansion in the years before the global economic and financial 
crisis of 2008. This process of internationalisation proceeded both 
directly through cross-border investment (hereafter “cross-border 
bank flows”) and indirectly through expansion of local banking ac-
tivity in the countries of destination. The bankruptcy of Lehman 
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BOX 1CROSS-BORDER BANK FLOWS TO LATIN AMERICA (cont’d)
Brothers suddenly interrupted this process, with a more notable 
impact on cross-border bank flows than on the local banking ac-
tivity of foreign banks. Panel 1 shows that the successive bouts of 
financial instability since 2008 continue to have a significant nega-
tive impact on cross-border activity. 
This Box describes cross-border bank flows to Latin America in 
recent years and compares them with those to other emerging re-
gions, using the international banking statistics compiled by the 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS). The analysis is made with 
so-called Locational Banking Statistics (LBS), which are more ap-
propriate for studying trends in international financial integration 
(because they focus on cross-border bank flows from the country 
of origin) than Consolidated Banking Statistics (CBS), also pub-
lished by the BIS (which include both local exposure and the ex-
posure through investments from the country of origin) and, ac-
cordingly, are more suitable for analysing the risks derived from 
such international expansion.1
In particular, LBS allow analysis of whether the deleveraging de-
rived from the global financial crisis or, more recently, from the 
euro area sovereign debt crisis, is constraining cross-border fund-
ing. The analysis focuses in this case on emerging economies, 
particularly those in Latin America. This issue is important, among 
other reasons, because of its impact on the financial conditions in 
the countries receiving these flows.
The recovery of cross-border bank flows following the bankruptcy 
of Lehman Brothers has been irregular, with significant differences 
between the advanced and the emerging economies. On the one 
hand, as seen in Panel 1, bank flows to advanced economies have 
not recouped their levels prior to 2008. On the other, cross-border 
bank flows to the emerging economies as a whole rebounded 
strongly to levels above the previous highs, following the severe 
contraction between 2008 and 2009, although, as seen in Panel 2, 
regional composition changed significantly. Thus, flows to eastern 
Europe recorded a persistent contraction followed by an addition-
al reduction from 2011 Q3, while emerging Asia and Latin America 
and the Caribbean recorded an upward trend, recouping and even 
exceeding the levels prior to 2008.
Recently these developments have been subject to significant 
fluctuations due to euro area instability, which has had a marked 
impact on emerging Asia. Note that in 2011 Q4 cross-border bank 
flows to this region showed a negative stock of around $70 billion, 
which contrasts with the strong inflows of previous quarters. 
Cross-border bank flows to Latin America and the Caribbean un-
derwent smaller fluctuations than in other emerging areas, but ex-
hibited qualitatively similar features. The breakdown by counter-
party sector (see Panel 3) shows how cross-border bank flows to 
the banking sector showed the largest fluctuations in Latin Ameri-
ca, a phenomenon similar to that seen in other regions.
The breakdown by country highlights the notable reversal of 
cross-border bank flows to Mexico in 2011 Q3 (see Panel 4), and 
the fall, smaller in absolute terms but highly significant, in Chile. In 
Brazil, a country financially integrated in the international markets, 
cross-border bank flows decreased in 2011 to become practically 
zero, and even posted a negative stock in 2011 Q4. Cross-border 
bank funding to the non-banking sector proved more resilient than 
that to the banking sector, although in 2011 Q4 it decreased in 
Brazil and Mexico.
These developments explain why cross-border bank positions (i.e. 
the volume of cross-border assets measured by LBS statistics) 
vis-à-vis Latin America and the Caribbean and vis-à-vis emerging 
Asia have tended to increase since the crisis, unlike in emerging 
Europe, where they have gradually decreased (see Panel 5). In any 
event, cross-border banking positions vis-à-vis Latin America 
continue to be smaller, measured in absolute terms, than the posi-
tions vis-à-vis other emerging regions. The breakdown by country 
also shows how the increase in international bank positions in 
Latin America has been practically across-the-board, reflecting 
the higher international financial integration. Panel 6 shows that in 
absolute terms the positions are larger in Brazil and Mexico, but 
that the relative positions, measured as a percentage of GDP, are 
more significant in Chile. 
Overall, cross-border bank flows to Latin America have been more 
stable than those to the advanced economies or to other emerging 
regions. In Latin America, more than in other regions, foreign 
banks have operated through local banks, and this type of banking 
activity has been less affected by the crisis. These two circum-
stances may explain why, in regions like Latin America, the impact 
of the recurring bouts of financial instability on local financial con-
ditions has been relatively slight to date. 
1  There are two reasons why Locational Banking Statistics are of more 
interest for analysing trends in international financial integration: (i) LBS 
include assets and liabilities of the banks resident in a country vis-à-vis 
the rest of the world, including vis-à-vis non-resident banks in the same 
group, while CBS are designed for studying the risks derived from the 
international expansion of banking systems and thus aggregate the in-
ternational positions of the banks whose parent is located in a certain 
country with the positions of affiliates or subsidiaries located abroad, 
excluding the positions between them and their parents; and (ii) LBS, 
unlike CBS, show changes in exchange-rate value-adjusted positions, 
thus allowing a more accurate estimate of changes in cross-border bank 
flows by adjusting for this effect. For a detailed explanation of the bank-
ing statistics of the BIS and their various uses, see BIS, “Guide to the 
international financial statistics” (2009).
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SOURCES: Datastream and JP Morgan.
a MSCI indices in local currency.
b ???????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????? 
c Latin American MSCI index in local currency.
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at the beginning of 2009 (slightly less than $200 billion compared with more than $250 billion at 
the beginning of 2011). However, the breakdown of these inflows also changed very 
significantly since, while direct investment inflows held close to historical peaks (around 
$140 billion), portfolio investment flows fell back substantially to levels slightly below 
$50 billion (compared with $120 billion at the beginning of 2011). This moderation in 
portfolio inflows is accounted for by Brazil since portfolio investment inflows into Mexico 
remained very buoyant. Conversely, direct investment flows were very robust in most 
countries: Brazil ($56 billion), as well as Chile ($22 billion), Mexico and Colombia. Thus, 
direct investment inflows stood at 2.6% of regional GDP in Q2, higher than the aggre-
gate current deficit.
From June the region’s financial indicators improved significantly despite the backdrop of 
higher volatility. Sovereign spreads narrowed towards 350 bp, recovering their levels of 
prior to the turmoil in summer 2011, with sharper falls in the more stable countries, where-
as the stock markets increased 14% in dollar terms, slightly more than Asia (10%). Also, 
fixed-income issuance improved on international markets, although Latin American issu-
ers were less active than in 2012 Q1. Thus, in the six months analysed, issues amounting 
to more than $37 billion were placed (see Chart 4), compared with $41 billion in January-
March, representing 23% of total emerging economies’ issues compared with 32% in Q1. 
Brazil and Mexico continue to be the main issuers. In Mexico there is a high level of 
SOURCES: Dealogic, JP Morgan, IMF and national statistics.
a IMF estimate.
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concentration since only six firms have tapped the markets in this period —compared with 
ten in Brazil— and only one firm accounted for 54% of total issuance.
Following the depreciation of most Latin American currencies since March, the rise in 
capital inflows from June led exchange rates to recover their previous levels. The notable 
exception was the Brazilian real which has corrected part of its previous overvaluation, in 
a setting of worsening terms of trade and supported by measures taken by the Bank of 
Brazil, mainly the reduction of official interest rates against a backdrop in which it was pos-
sible to withdraw some of the controls used in the past to moderate capital inflows.
Following Q1 when sound growth was confirmed in Latin America (averaging 0.9% quarter-
on-quarter) the pace of expansion tended to moderate in Q2 to rates of 0.5%, while the 
year-on-year rate stood at 2.6%, down from 3.3% in Q1. This easing was influenced by 
activity in Brazil (0.5% year-on-year in Q2) and Argentina (0% year-on-year), since Mexico 
and Venezuela posted growth above 4% year-on-year in Q2, albeit slowing slightly with 
respect to Q1, whereas Chile, Colombia and Peru increased their pace of growth in Q2 
with year-on-year rates of 5.5%, 4.9% and 6.1%, respectively (see Chart 5).
In terms of the regional average, domestic demand remained the main support for activity, 
contributing 3.2 pp to GDP growth in Q2 (see Chart 6). However, it was also the GDP com-
ponent that slowed most (1 pp down on the previous quarter and 2 pp down on the average 
Activity and demand
SOURCE: National statistics.
a Aggregate of the seven main economies.
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for 2011), mainly due to the weak performance of gross capital formation in several of the 
largest countries. By contrast, private consumption was more resilient and inventories 
contributed somewhat to growth, following two quarters of negative contributions.
Gross capital formation eased significantly at regional level and increased 1.9% year-on-year 
in Q2 (compared with 5% in Q1), the lowest rate since 2009. However, there was extensive 
cross-country disparity since in Colombia, Peru and Venezuela investment grew at year-on-
year rates of more than 15%, while in Argentina it fell 15% and in Brazil it declined 3.5%. 
These differences correspond to different positions in the cycle and specific factors. In Colom-
bia and Peru investment rose notably in a setting of expanding activity and a sharp increase 
in foreign direct investment. Conversely, in Brazil investment weakened because of the cycli-
cal slowdown and the industrial sector’s difficulties, partly due to the currency overvaluation, 
but also due to structural problems. In Argentina the strong contraction seems to be largely 
explained by the recently applied foreign exchange controls and restrictions on imports, while 
in Venezuela investment increased as a result of higher public spending and investment (hous-
ing programmes), in view of the elections. From the standpoint of financing investment, note 
that credit growth remained high – despite international financial instability – and that firms 
continued to have ample access to funding markets in most countries.
SOURCES: National statistics and IMF.
a Aggregate of the seven main economies.
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Private consumption showed greater resilience, although its growth moderated slightly to 
an average rate for the region of 3.4% year-on-year in Q2, in contrast with 4.2% in Q1 and 
rates of more than 5% in 2011. The slowdown centred mainly on two countries (Mexico 
and Argentina) since in the other countries growth rates remained similar to those of the 
previous year. Major determinants of the attendant developments here were the labour 
market situation, agents’ confidence and credit, which continued to perform well in gen-
eral, without many changes with respect to previous quarters. The average unemployment 
rate for the region held at similar levels to those in 2011, of around 7.6% of the labour 
force, close to the record lows (see Chart 7). In Brazil and Chile the labour market remained 
robust recording unemployment rates of around 6% and 6.5%, respectively, several points 
below those recorded in 2008, with some wage pressures. In Colombia and Peru the un-
employment rate continued to move along a decelerating path, which shows the buoyant 
activity in both economies. In Mexico employment growth averaged 4.1% in the first half 
of the year, although the highest rise was in poor quality jobs, as has been the case since 
the crisis in 2008. Notwithstanding this, and the decline in the numbers unemployed, the 
unemployment rate stabilised around 5% which is still about 1 pp higher than before the 
crisis. In Argentina job creation fell in the last two quarters for the first time since the ex-
pansionary cycle in 2002 and the unemployment rate rose slightly to 7.2% in Q2.
SOURCE: National statistics.
a Aggregate of the seven main economies.
b Aggregate of Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Colombia and Venezuela.
c Aggregate of the eight main economies (the former plus Uruguay).
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The negative contribution of external demand stood at 0.9 pp, similar to previous quar-
ters, however, on this occasion it is explained by the slowdown of exports which posted 
a year-on-year rate of change of -0.6% in Q2 (compared with 6.2% in Q1). In previous 
quarters, the negative contribution of external demand had largely been in response to a 
strong increase in imports, in a setting of strong domestic demand and buoyant exports. 
This trend towards a slowdown of exports was widespread, Mexico being the main ex-
ception —its cycle is closely tied to the US industrial cycle— with export growth of 6.3% 
year-on-year in Q2.
The average nominal decline in the region’s exports was -4% in year-on-year terms in July 
(see Chart 8), which means that the downward trend that began in the second half of 2011 
was prolonged, after a year of growth rates of roughly 30%. The fall was sharper in value 
than in volume due to the drop in commodity prices in some countries in the first half of 
the year (mainly metal and energy prices which decreased by around 15%-20%) and due 
to the exchange rate depreciation in other countries. By destination, South America’s ex-
ports to the EU, its main trading partner, fell 8.3% year-on-year to June and, by contrast, 
SOURCES: National statistics, central banks and Banco de España.
a Customs data in dollars, aggregate of the seven main economies.
b Four-quarter moving average.
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exports to the US grew 4.3% and those to China were up 7.8%, although they also slowed. 
In Mexico the slowdown arose from the contraction of fuel exports and, on the destination 
side, of exports to the US and Brazil due to the suspension of the Economic Complemen-
tation Agreements with Mexico. Foreign trade between Brazil and Argentina also weak-
ened considerably as a result of the latter’s import restrictions.
Since imports are highly correlated with exports, they also eased in recent months, albeit 
slightly less than exports. This resulted in a moderate reduction of the region’s trade sur-
plus to under 2% of GDP which is mainly explained by developments in Brazil, and in the 
commodities exporters, Chile and Peru. In Argentina the trade surplus widened substan-
tially. In this setting the current deficit, measured as a percentage of regional GDP, held 
steady at around 1% of GDP but widened to slightly more than $55 billion and its distribu-
tion changed, with the result that all the region’s largest economies (except Venezuela) are 
currently running a current account deficit (whereas at the beginning of the year only three 
countries did). The slowdown of economic growth has not changed this trend to date. The 
current deficit widened particularly quickly in Chile to 3% of GDP, despite continued high 
copper prices and positive terms of trade. This widening is associated with the robust in-
vestment process and the normalisation of the savings rate following the crisis.
The latest economic indicators show mixed signs. On one hand, the industrial sector seems 
to have bottomed out, judging by the recent recovery of industrial production, and is show-
ing signs of picking up in Brazil and Argentina, two countries which had shown a weaker 
performance to date (see Chart 7). Contributory factors in the first case were the economic 
policy stimulus and the partial correction of the strong appreciation of the effective ex-
change rate of the Brazilian real in recent years, since it has depreciated by almost 20% 
over the last year (see Chart 8). On the other, indicators related to the external sector and 
to consumer and business confidence are on the downside in the other countries, partly 
reflecting uncertainty about the outlook for the global economy and weak external demand.
In Latin America as a whole, inflation experienced few changes in the last six months. The 
average inflation rate of the seven largest economies stood in September at 6.2% year-
on-year, the same rate as in March (see Chart 9). Core inflation stood at 6.1%, only 0.3 pp 
lower than its levels of 2012 Q1, despite the significant slowdown in growth, which under-
lines some downward stickiness in prices, albeit with considerable cross-country differences. 
Thus, in Mexico inflation increased appreciably (to 4.8% in September, 0.9 pp up on 
March) which can be explained by an isolated supply shock arising from bird flu, that 
hardly affected core inflation or long-term inflation expectations. In the other countries, 
inflation stabilised (Brazil, 5.3% year-on-year) or posted a slight downward trend (Colom-
bia and Peru, 3.1% and 3.7%, respectively, in September), underpinned by the modera-
tion of food and energy prices, a trend which, nonetheless, has recently been interrupted. 
In Chile inflation slipped more notably to 2.8% year-on-year which is lower than the cen-
tral bank’s target, partly as a consequence of the appreciation of the exchange rate.
In Argentina and Venezuela inflation rates remained very high. Inflation in Argentina held at 
around 10% according to official figures (although private estimates indicate more than 
double this figure), a situation which has got worse on account of the monetary financing 
of the burgeoning government deficit. In Venezuela the growth rate of prices moderated 
somewhat, but still stands above 19%.
In this setting, the rise in food prices in Q3 (see Chart 9) caused some concern, given 
the high weight of this item in the consumption basket in several countries in the region. 
Prices and 
macroeconomic policies
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Country Target December Ful??lment September Expectations (a) Expectations (a)
Brazil 4,5 ± 2 6,5 Yes 5.3  5.2 5.3
Mexico 3 ± 1 3,8 Yes 4.8  4.0 3.7
Chile 3 ± 1 4,4 No 2.8  2.2 3.1
Colombia 3 ± 1 3,7 Yes 3.1  3.1 3.1
Peru 2 ± 1 4,7 No 3.7  3.0 2.9
2011 2012 2013
INFLATION 
Year-on-year rates of change 
TABLE 2
  
SOURCES: National statistics and Consensus Forecasts.
a September 2012 Consensus Forecasts for the end of the year.
SOURCES: National statistics and Banco de España.
a Aggregate of the seven main economies.
b Weighted average of the of?cial rates of the ?ve coutries with in?ation targets (see Table 2).
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The depreciation since the beginning of the year of several Latin American currencies and 
the labour market tightness in several countries constitute other risk factors. However, the 
fact that this rise has not been as widespread by product as that recorded in 2008, that 
energy prices have not increased to the same extent, and that the less buoyant setting has 
contributed to closing output gaps in some countries, indicates that pressures on food 
prices could feed through on this occasion to inflation rates and, especially, to inflation 
expectations to a smaller degree than they did at that time. In any event, this background 
contributes to explaining why the downward cycle in interest rates has not spread. Brazil’s 
central bank has continued to cut its official interest rates heavily (by 525 bp since the 
beginning of the cycle to 7.25%); Colombia’s central bank has lowered them by 25 bp on 
two occasions in July and August, to 4.75%. The other central banks in countries with 
inflation targets have adopted a wait-and-see stance and further action will depend to a 
large degree on developments in the external environment.
The stimulus measures were not restricted to conventional monetary policy in Brazil. A 
series of measures was also adopted to bring down the cost of credit, such as modifying 
the lower limit of savings deposits (considered a floor for official interest rates); an indirect 
reduction of the bank reserve requirement; a cut in the long-term interest rate on loans 
extended by the public bank to 5.5% and the abolition of the tax on financial transactions 
(IOF by its Portuguese acronym) for operations abroad with a maturity of more than two 
years. In Peru, by contrast, a series of restrictive measures were taken in this area such as 
raising the local and foreign currency bank reserve requirement in September and October 
in order to moderate the inflow of short-term capital and credit growth, although the re-
quirements in respect of foreign trade transactions were reduced.
In the fiscal arena Brazil and Peru were the countries which announced most measures. In 
the former, various stimulus packages were approved, slightly shifting spending towards 
investment, although without changing the target of a primary surplus for 2012 or 2013 
(3.1% of GDP). However, the outturn to August indicates a considerably lower primary 
surplus in 2012 of 2.5% of GDP. In the other countries the fiscal policy measures were less 
significant. The region’s fiscal and primary balances hardly changed with respect to 2011, 
averaging around -2% of GDP for the former and around 1.5% for the latter (see Chart 10). 
Cross-country differences, however, were pronounced since, whereas in Brazil and Chile 
the primary surpluses fell and in Argentina there was a primary deficit (measured in cumu-
lative four-quarter terms), in Colombia and Peru, as a result of the favourable performance 
of revenue, their primary surpluses rose noticeably. In this setting, the public debt/GDP 
ratios stabilised and in some countries continued their downward trend.
Finally, exchange rate policy has not had to face in this half-year period the upward pres-
sures and dilemmas seen recurrently in 2008, 2010 and 2011, in a setting in which capital 
inflows have tended to moderate (especially portfolio inflows). Accordingly, in certain 
countries the active use of exchange controls and declines in interest rates seem to have 
had some effect on moderating the upward pressures. Furthermore, the international fi-
nancial markets have experienced moments of high risk aversion which have also eased 
the pressure on and even triggered the depreciation of currencies. Nevertheless, the au-
thorities of Peru and Colombia, for instance, have continued to intervene on foreign ex-
change markets when they have perceived that there is an overvaluation risk of their cur-
rencies (see Box 2). This possibility has even been weighed up in Chile due to the 
appreciation of the peso, although the authorities have reiterated that levels which would 
justify an intervention have not been breached. In Peru a new exchange rate intervention 
policy was announced which is geared at buying smaller amounts of dollars for a fixed 
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amount, irrespective of any appreciation of the new sol exchange rate, in order to intro-
duce greater exchange rate volatility and to discourage speculation and indebtedness in 
dollars. Finally, in some countries such as Brazil, there seems to be lower tolerance of an 
appreciation of the exchange rate: following the depreciation of the real against the dollar 
over the year, the announcement of a third round of monetary easing by the Federal Re-
serve unleashed buying of dollars at certain thereshold levels of the exchange rate which 
are considerably lower than last year, and even prompted statements about the possible 
reintroduction of the tax on cross-border financial transactions in order to moderate spec-
ulative financial inflows. In the region as a whole, however, the build up of reserves in the 
last six months has been much more limited.
The trade integration processes in the region continued to progress differently in the 
countries on the Pacific Rim, which continued to focus on foreign trade, and in Mercosur 
where the protectionist tensions between Argentina and Brazil heightened with the adop-
tion of measures – although announced as temporary – that have restricted inter-regional 
trade. In addition to this problem, there were also fresh political tensions among the bloc’s 
members and progress on agreements with other actors in world trade was impossible. 
Integration processes 
and structural policies
SOURCES:  IMF and national statistics.
a Seven main economies.
b De?ated by the CPI.
c Aggregate excluding Venezuela.
d Excludes untendered debt in the debt swap offers of 2005 and 2010.
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BOX 2ARE FOREIGN EXCHANGE INTERVENTIONS EFFECTIVE IN LATIN AMERICA? EVIDENCE FOR FOUR COUNTRIES 
IN THE REGION1
Foreign exchange interventions consist of foreign currency pur-
chases or sales undertaken with the aim of influencing the level 
and/or volatility of the local currency. If a central bank considers 
that the exchange rate of its currency has deviated excessively 
from its equilibrium, it will buy (sell) a foreign currency during peri-
ods of upward (downward) pressures. Currently, practically all of 
these interventions, including those in Latin America, are sterilised 
through open market operations in order to eliminate their effect 
on the internal money supply. While unsterilised interventions have 
a direct impact on the exchange rate through the monetary chan-
nel, sterilised interventions have an impact through indirect chan-
nels, although there is still broad theoretical and empirical debate 
about these, both for developed and emerging countries.2
Thus, much of the empirical literature analysing this question reach-
es unfavourable conclusions about their degree of effectiveness: 
namely, the interventions are estimated not to have a significant in-
fluence on the exchange rate and even seemingly increase exchange 
rate volatility. However, this finding may be the result of a simultane-
ity problem inherent to the data since the interventions are a re-
sponse to excessive exchange rate volatility and, consequently, the 
dates of both usually coincide. That is to say, concluding that greater 
volatility is the result of the intervention could be misleading.3 This 
evidence contrasts with the widespread use of foreign exchange in-
terventions by central banks. In fact, according to different surveys 
of central banks, the latter trust in the usefulness of these interven-
tions for influencing the level and volatility of the exchange rate.
In addition to this lack of consensus is the fact that very few countries 
publish their daily interventions – the commonest frequency for this 
type of analysis. This explains why most empirical studies focus on a 
few economies: the United States, Japan and Australia. Conversely, 
studies which have analysed emerging market economies (EMEs) are 
more scarce, largely due to the lower availability of data, which are 
frequently considered confidential. Although the dissemination of this 
information is gradually increasing, only a few EMEs (mainly from Lat-
in America) publish these figures with the aforementioned frequency.
Foreign exchange interventions in EMEs differ in nature from those 
of developed countries and, consequently, their effects could be 
different. Thus, this type of operations is more frequent in EMEs 
than in developed countries, even where the economies follow an 
inflation-targeting regime, although theoretically this regime 
should be linked to a freely floating exchange rate.4 This flexible 
implementation of inflation targeting is very common in emerging 
economies given their vulnerability to abrupt movements in the 
exchange rate and, consequently, their exchange rate manage-
ment is usually more active than in developed economies.5 A prio-
ri, it could be thought that the effect of interventions on EMEs 
would have a bigger impact on the exchange rate than in devel-
oped economies, given the larger size of their interventions in rela-
tion to the foreign exchange trading volumes since they are less 
sophisticated markets than developed ones. However, the empiri-
cal studies for EMEs are not conclusive either.
The study on which this box is based analyses the effect of the 
interventions on foreign exchange levels and volatilities in the four 
economies in the region which publish their data daily – Chile, Co-
lombia, Mexico and Peru – through various GARCH models. As a 
result of these models it is possible to take into account the volatil-
ity of the data in the estimation.6 These four economies follow 
monetary policy systems based on the fulfilment of inflation tar-
geting and constitute a representative sample of Latin America, 
although the main country in the region, Brazil,7 is missing. Panel 
1 shows bilateral exchange rates against the dollar of the Chilean 
peso, the Colombian peso, the Mexican peso and the Peruvian 
new sol, together with their corresponding daily interventions.
The Panel shows the varied characteristics of foreign exchange 
interventions in terms of frequency and size, which differ consider-
ably by country. Thus, these intervention strategies range from 
purely discretionary ones (Peru), to the use of intervention rules 
(Chile and, recently, Mexico and Colombia), where the authorities 
publicly announce the amount of foreign currency to be bought or 
sold during a specific period, and where more frequent interven-
tions of a smaller size than the ad hoc interventions seem to be 
involved.8 This diversity of strategies employed by the EMEs con-
trasts with that of developed economies that currently perform 
interventions, such as Japan, where the tendency is to intervene 
discretionally and only under exceptional circumstances.
1  Based on C. Broto (2012), The effectiveness of forex interventions in four 
Latin American countries, Documentos de Trabajo, No. 1226, Banco de 
España.
2  Usually, three theoretical transmission channels of the effects of steri-
lised interventions are cited: the signalling channel, the portfolio-balance 
channel and the international coordination channel [see Sarno and Tay-
lor (2001) for more details].
3  Endogeneity problems are present in virtually all the empirical applica-
tions that analyse the effectiveness of foreign exchange interventions. 
Simultaneity problems are also behind some of the scantily intuitive re-
sults which are consistent with leaning against the wind strategies in 
which, for example, dollar purchases give rise to an appreciation of the 
exchange rate [Kim et al. (2000)].
4  In principle, assuming that there is mobility of capital flows, an inde-
pendent monetary policy cannot coexist with an exchange rate that is 
fixed or pegged to another currency through foreign exchange interven-
tions (the policy dilemma of the impossible trinity).
5  Berganza and Broto (2012).
6  The main empirical contributions which study the impact of interventions 
on the exchange rate have used variants of the GARCH (Generalised 
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity) models. See, for exam-
ple, Domínguez (1998).
7  Brazil is not included in the sample because daily data on its foreign 
exchange interventions are not available. They publish daily volumes of 
reserves, but the variation in international reserves is a poor approxima-
tion of the interventions [Adler and Tovar (2011)].
8  There are two types of rules: those which aim to moderate exchange 
rate volatility (Colombia) and those which seek a mechanism to build up 
reserves (Chile). Mexico also uses the first type of rule with variation in 
the direction of the intervention (dollar purchases or sales on the spot 
market or via options). At present and since November 2011, a rule has 
been applied of buying up to $400 million daily if the peso depreciates 
by more than 2% daily against the dollar.
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BOX 2ARE FOREIGN EXCHANGE INTERVENTIONS EFFECTIVE IN LATIN AMERICA? EVIDENCE FOR FOUR COUNTRIES 
IN THE REGION (cont’d)
Another significant aspect is the possible asymmetrical effect of the 
interventions, namely, whether the magnitude of the impact of the 
foreign currency sales (negative interventions to avoid currency de-
preciation) on the level and volatility of the exchange rate is different 
to that of purchases (positive interventions with the aim of mitigating 
appreciation). This question had virtually not been analysed to date, 
however, following the outbreak of the global economic financial 
crisis in summer 2007, many central banks of EMEs implemented 
sales of reserves, of the opposite sign to those predominating prior 
to the crisis, which makes it easier to study this matter. Panel 1 
shows that from the beginning of the period analysed, in Chile, Co-
lombia and Peru interventions to purchase dollars have predomi-
nated, coinciding with the appreciation of their bilateral exchange 
rate against the dollar. Conversely, in Mexico dollar sales are more 
usual, given the depreciating trend of the Mexican peso and the 
central bank’s strategy of smoothing market trends.
Several conclusions can be drawn from the empirical study. For 
instance, foreign exchange interventions seem to have asymmetri-
cal effects, especially on exchange rate volatility. Furthermore, 
monitoring interventions based on their sign makes it easier to 
analyse the type of intervention, in terms of frequency and size, 
which is more effective. The results of the various estimations offer 
a clear pattern: on one hand, the size of the interventions does not 
seem to play an important role in reducing volatility or in achieving 
a specific exchange rate level. By contrast, isolated interventions 
or those which are the first following the adoption of a rule or in a 
series of interventions do seem to moderate exchange rate volatil-
ity in the four countries. The results for the level of the exchange 
rate are not as robust.
Since the four economies follow inflation targeting, this evidence 
suggests that the ad hoc interventions or the initial ones, following 
the creation of a rule, provide a signal to markets, irrespective of 
their size, and reduce exchange rate volatility. This result could be 
linked to the credibility of the inflation-targeting regime and offer 
further empirical support for the advantages of monetary policies 
instrumented through flexible inflation targeting. Additionally, these 
conclusions would support the empirical validity of the signalling 
channel in sterilised interventions, insofar as central banks would be 
indicating to the markets information about their future monetary 
policy or their outlook for the long-term equilibrium exchange rate.
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Thus, the Pacific Rim countries (Colombia, Peru, Chile and Mexico) created the Pacific Alli-
ance in order to step up trade integration and to counter the protectionism of other blocs in the 
region, at the same time as they continued to sign or negotiate treaties such as that between 
Colombia and South Korea. Conversely, within Mercosur protectionist measures abound-
ed such as new tariffs on capital goods imported by Argentina or various measures to 
protect local industry in Brazil, including, inter alia, the restriction of the automobile free-
trade agreement with Mexico. At the summit held end-June the number of tariff items for 
which a temporary tariff increase was permitted for non-Mercosur products was raised 
from 100 to 200, although non-trade matters dominated the summit, in particular, Vene-
zuela officially joining the trade bloc. No specific plans for opening up trade to other major 
players such as the European Union or China were made.
Turning to structural reforms, the new Mexican government suggested the possibility of 
implementing a labour reform (with unemployment benefit, regulation of temporary em-
ployment, reform of the role of trade unions and the introduction of a trial period in con-
tracts), the universalisation of the social security system financed through taxes, an energy 
reform (opening up PEMEX to private investors while maintaining ownership and control of 
the company) and fiscal reform (broadening the VAT bases). Furthermore, the labour re-
form, proposed by the outgoing president of Mexico was approved, albeit with a smaller 
scope than was originally proposed. In Peru, the parliament approved the private pension 
system reform in order to increase current coverage of those contributing by 40% with the 
introduction of certain conditions for compulsory contributions (only 34% of employees 
are covered under these arrangements) and reduce the commissions charged by the em-
ployee pension fund managers. A tax reform was also approved which intends to raise tax 
revenue by 3 pp of GDP in five years, by abolishing certain tax allowances and reducing 
tax evasion. In Chile a tax reform was also approved with the aim of increasing tax revenue 
by reducing evasion, increasing corporate income tax, abolishing some allowances and 
eliminating legal loopholes which give risk to tax arbitrage. An increase in the tax on to-
bacco was also agreed, representing a further 0.2% of GDP to be used for improvements 
in education. Furthermore, half of household expenditure on education will be deductible. 
In Venezuela a new Labour Law was approved which increases labour costs and the pay-
ment of pensions and aims to reduce the shadow labour market. Lastly, the Bolivian gov-
ernment issued a decree for the expropriation of Transportadora de Electricidad, a sub-
sidiary of the Spanish group Red Eléctrica, on the grounds of insufficient investment.
Economic activity in Brazil remained sluggish in the first half of the year, recovering more 
slowly than expected from the sharp slowdown recorded in the second half of 2011. GDP 
grew 0.4% quarter-on-quarter in 2012 Q2, after having expanded by 0.1% in Q1, and the 
year-on-year growth rate eased to 0.6% in Q2, down from 0.8% in Q1. This performance 
was once again explained by weak gross capital formation (-3.7% year-on-year), whereas 
private consumption continued to increase at a moderate pace (2.5%). The negative con-
tribution of external demand stood at 0.5 pp, in line with previous quarters, the difference 
being that it was linked to a 3.9% contraction in exports in year-on-year terms. The lack-
lustre state of the economy stems from industrial weakness which is partly attributable to 
the delayed effect of the exchange rate appreciation in recent quarters, that despite having 
been corrected, could be weighing on competitiveness. Another factor that has had a 
negative impact on growth is lower external demand, partly linked to the restrictions im-
posed by Argentina and the weakness of the euro area. Factors such as rising household 
indebtedness could also have moderated growth of private consumption with respect to 
more robust growth recorded in prior years. In conjunction with this, growth is being lim-
ited by structural factors which include, most notably, the high cost of capital and the 
Economic developments 
by country
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 58 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, OCTOBER 2012 REPORT ON THE LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMY. SECOND HALF OF 2012
shortage of infrastructures. Activity indicators point to a slight recovery of the economy at 
the end of Q2, due to more buoyant retail sales and a slight pick-up in industrial produc-
tion, underpinned by the considerable stimulus provided by economic policies. Inflation 
stood at 5.3% in year-on-year terms in September, practically unchanged relative to its 
level six months ago. Credit to the private sector posted high growth rates of 17% year-
on-year to August, despite lower growth in recent months. The Brazilian real experienced 
the highest depreciating trend in the region during the last six months, moving within a 
range of 2-2.1 reales to the dollar, partly due to lower portfolio inflows (see Chart 11). In 
this setting, the central bank extended monetary easing, cutting official interest rates by a 
further 175 bp to 7.25%, which represents a reduction since the beginning of the down-
ward cycle of 525 bp. The current account deficit held steady at around 2.2% of GDP. In 
the fiscal area, the primary surplus decreased over the six months to 2.5% of GDP in Au-
gust, below the target set at 3.1% of GDP. This reduction in the surplus stems from lower-
than-projected revenue —affected by the cyclical slowdown and lower extraordinary rev-
enue— and the increase in spending (partly linked to the increase in the minimum wage 
which came into effect at the beginning of the year). The target of a primary surplus of 
3.1% is maintained in the draft budget for 2013. Against a backdrop of a persistently weak 
industrial sector, certain tax relief and allowances were introduced or extended in order to 
boost the car industry and investment in capital goods. An infrastructure investment plan 
was announced, an area in which there is deemed to be a significant shortage. As a result 
of this 25-year plan, investments will be made in highways and railways amounting to 
1.8% of GDP over the next five years; it will include resources from the public bank 
(BNDES), with private funding and tax allowances, and has been assessed positively since 
it is targeted at overcoming some of the structural limitations on Brazil’s growth.
In Mexico, the economy performed better than expected in the first half of 2012, quicken-
ing slightly with respect to the previous half-year period. The higher buoyancy was espe-
cially noticeable in Q1 when GDP grew 1.2% quarter-on-quarter (4.5% year-on-year) and 
the pace of expansion moderated in Q2 (0.9% quarter-on-quarter and 4.1% year-on-year). 
By component, growth was supported by the robust increase in investment (7.5% in the 
first half of the year, as a whole), underpinned by government investment which grew 
11.1% in the six-month period and offset a slight slowdown in private investment (6.6%), 
which nonetheless remained notably buoyant; conversely, private consumption moderated 
SOURCES: Banco Central de México, Banco Central de Brasil, Oxford Economics and Datastream.
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notably (3.8% in the six-month period, as a whole). Furthermore, exports grew by 6.3% 
year-on-year in Q2 which exceeded the growth rate of imports, generating a positive con-
tribution from external demand. The higher frequency data indicate that the pace of growth 
in activity remained the same, with a higher contribution from industry and the external 
sector, and a slightly lower one from domestic demand. The external sector seems to be 
benefitting, among other factors, from a gradual narrowing of the wage-cost differential 
with respect to China, one of its main competitors in the US market (see Chart 11), al-
though the gap is estimated to continue at around 25%. Private consumption was sup-
ported by fluid access to financing (consumer credit continues to expand at high rates in 
the region of 19% in real terms) and by the gradual improvement in the labour market, al-
though mostly poor-quality jobs continue to be created. By contrast, the growth rate of 
remittances eased in the first half of the year and showed a negative year-on-year rate of 
change in July. Investment, as indicated above, held at high growth levels insofar as the 
cost of borrowing, both internally and externally, fell back and the rate of increase of cred-
it quickened in the six-month period. Inflation rose strongly from April onwards, up from a 
rate of 3.4% to 4.8% in September, above the upper interval of the central bank’s target 
range (3%±1%), owing to the shortage of certain foods due to isolated supply problems. 
Core inflation held at 3.6% and medium and long-term inflation expectations remain an-
chored at around 3.5%, although short-term inflation expectations rose further to the pub-
lication of official figures. Against this background, the central bank kept its official rate 
unchanged at 4.5%, where it has held since July 2009 and although in September the tone 
of its statement was more restrictive, a tightening of monetary conditions in coming quar-
ters has not yet been discounted. The peso depreciated 10.2% between April and May, 
which activated on two occasions the dollar auctions that had been reintroduced in No-
vember 2011, and subsequently recovered to similar levels to those in March. In the fiscal 
realm, the deficit decreased to 2.5% of GDP (considering PEMEX’s investment), from 
2.7% at end-2011, due to the higher contribution of the state-owned petrol company to 
the budget. The current account balance posted a deficit of 0.5% of GDP in Q2 — lower 
than in previous quarters — as a result of the ongoing wide trade surplus. Capital inflows 
declined, particularly those related to carry trade operations. Finally, on 1 July presidential 
and parliamentary elections were held in Mexico which were won by the PRI. The first task 
for the new government, which came to power on 1 September, will be drawing up next 
year’s budget for which no changes to taxes are expected.
Activity in Argentina, which had already lost momentum in the second half of 2011, slowed 
further over the first half of the year. Thus, in Q2 real GDP fell 0.8% quarter-on-quarter (fol-
lowing growth of 0.6% in Q1). In year-on-year terms, the economy recorded zero growth 
in Q2 (5.2% in Q1). Idiosyncratic factors have had a greater weight than external ones in 
the correction of activity. Accordingly, import restrictions have triggered a notable adjust-
ment in purchases abroad (-14% year-on-year) and in gross capital formation (-15%), due 
to the effect of investment in capital goods, whereas foreign exchange controls, among 
other consequences, have cooled down the housing sector, a market with mostly dollar-
denominated transactions. Consumption, by contrast, has held up as the main engine of 
growth. The private component increased 4.2% year-on-year in Q2 (10.7% in 2011) and 
government consumption rose 6.8% (10.9% in 2011). The contribution from external de-
mand was positive despite the 9.5% decline in exports, which is partly attributable to the 
weakness of Brazil. The high frequency indicators show that the economy could have 
begun to stabilise. In fact, although restrictions remain on the currency market, other fac-
tors dampening growth are abating. Accordingly, certain import restrictions have been 
relaxed, a better harvest is expected (with high prices) and Brazil, its main trading partner, 
seems to have got back onto a more buoyant path. The current account once again re-
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corded a positive balance (after posting a deficit in the three previous months) due to the 
higher trade surplus – despite the increase in the energy deficit. Public finances have de-
teriorated substantially as a result of the increase in primary expenditure and the fall in tax 
revenue, with the government deficit standing at 1.9% of GDP in Q2 in annualised terms. 
As a result of the foregoing, public institutions, including pension fund administrators and 
the central bank, have become more reliant on the Treasury for financing. The attendant 
advances to the Treasury have reached their highest level since January 2003. Growing 
recourse to the central bank has contributed to perpetuating high inflation, of around 10% 
according to official figures (although private estimates indicate rates of more than 20%). 
Negative real interest rates together with a continuing overvalued exchange rate are be-
hind the growing demand for dollars as a safe-haven asset and capital flight. Capital con-
trols have been implemented in an attempt to contain capital flight. These measures have 
succeeded in stabilising the volume of international reserves, but they have prompted the 
re-emergence of the informal market on which the dollar is traded at a high premium – of 
around 35% with respect to the official exchange rate (see Chart 12). At the same time the 
withdrawal of dollar deposits has stepped up to more than $6.5 billion (45% of total dollar 
deposits) since the sale of dollars was regulated at the end of last year.
Economic activity in Chile was notably buoyant in the first half of 2012, exceeding expec-
tations and showing high resilience to the deteriorating external environment and the see-
sawing of global markets. Thus, GDP in 2012 Q2 posted quarter-on-quarter growth of 
1.7% (5.5% year-on-year), which was even higher than in the previous quarter (1.3% quar-
ter-on-quarter and 5.3% year-on-year). The expansion continues to be led by domestic 
demand which grew 7.2% in Q2, underpinned by the favourable performance of the labour 
market and the temporary effect of strong inventory building. Thus, the contribution of 
external demand, which was positive in Q1 (0.6 pp), turned negative once again in Q2 (1.8 
pp), as a result in particular of the slowdown of exports, especially due to lower copper 
prices. The trade surplus fell by almost 67% in the nine months to end-September, due to 
a year-on-year decline in exports of 5.5% and an increase in imports of 4.3% which has 
widened the current account deficit, that stood at 2.7% of GDP in Q2 (see Chart 12). The 
high frequency indicators show that a slight slowdown has begun, especially in the invest-
ment component. Inflation has also been a favourable surprise throughout the year with a 
pronounced downward trend from rates of 4% in the early months of the year to 2.8% in 
September, although with a sharp contrast in the performance of tradeable and non-trade-
able goods prices. The rise in the former fell back notably due to the adjustment of energy 
SOURCES: Banco Central de Argentina, Banco Central de Chile and Reuters.
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and food prices, and due to the appreciating trend of the peso, which despite bouts of 
volatility has strengthened by around 10% since the beginning of the year. Conversely, the 
rise in non-tradeable goods prices remained high with pressures linked to the tightness of 
the labour market (unemployment rate of 6.4% in the quarter June-August and growth of 
real salaries by around 3% in recent months). In the future, inflation could reverse its trend 
in view of the recent rise in international food prices, however, long-term inflation expecta-
tions remain anchored at 3%. In this context, the central bank has left the official interest 
rate unchanged at 5% since January, when it implemented a cut of 25 bp. The interest rate 
curve does not discount short-term declines. The rate of expansion of bank lending has 
decreased slightly, although it continues to grow by more than 10% in real terms. In the 
fiscal arena, the surplus built up in the first half of the year (2% of GDP) was slightly higher 
than projected due to the favourable performance of tax collection. Thus, although the 
stimulus applied in 2009 and 2010 has not been fully withdrawn, a structural deficit of 
1.4% is projected to be reached before year-end, and the government’s target is for it to 
be 1% in 2014. Faced with a worsening external scenario, Chile not only has some room 
to relax monetary and fiscal policies, but it also has more than $39 billion in dollar reserves 
and a sovereign wealth fund, which in August amounted to almost $15 billion, while the 
Pension Reserve Fund totalled more than $5.7 billion.
In Colombia, following robust buoyancy in 2011, economic activity slowed down notably 
throughout 2012 Q1, although it regained greater momentum in Q2. Thus, quarter-on-
quarter growth was 1.6% in Q2 (0.3% in Q1), while the year-on-year rate stood at 4.9% in 
Q2 (4.7% in Q1). This performance is explained by developments in gross fixed invest-
ment, which during Q1 eased its year-on-year growth rate to 7.8%, while in Q2 it grew 
15.5%, owing especially to the quickening pace of civil engineering works. Private con-
sumption which had been growing strongly, supported by the gradual reduction of the 
unemployment rate, eased to 4.2% in Q2 due to less support from the labour market with 
an unemployment rate that has stabilised in recent months at 10.9%. Similarly, the contri-
bution from external demand was negative after imports increased by 9.5% and exports 
fell 2%. The high frequency indicators point to a slight slowdown prompted by both exter-
nal and local demand, especially in the manufacturing sector which also has been affected 
by the currency appreciation. In fact, business confidence has deteriorated continuously 
since the beginning of the year (see Chart 13). Inflation has gradually corrected from 3.6% 
in January to 3.1% in September. Furthermore, the real growth rate of credit decreased 
from 24% at the beginning of 2012 to less than 18%, which mitigates the associated risks. 
In this context, the central bank left official interest rates unchanged until its meetings in 
July and August, when it adopted cuts of 25 bp, leaving the official interest rate at 4.75% 
in September. Likewise, in order to control upward pressure on the Colombian peso, the 
central bank extended its daily dollar purchasing programme until March 2013, at the 
same time as the Public Treasury also began to make specific purchases. The central gov-
ernment’s deficit continues to moderate as a result of the increase in tax revenue (espe-
cially, oil-related revenue), which is widening the primary surplus and, consequently, it has 
been possible to revise downwards the fiscal deficit projection for 2012 by 0.4 pp to 2.4%.
Although Peru’s economy remains the most buoyant in the region, it has slowed slightly 
over the year. In Q2 GDP increased 1.4% quarter-on-quarter, below the rate of increase of 
2.1% posted in Q1. In year-on-year terms, GDP increased 6.1%, the same rate as in the 
previous quarter. Domestic demand continued to act as a support and private consump-
tion remained robust (5.6% year-on-year in Q2 and 5% in Q1) as did gross capital forma-
tion (16.1% in Q2 and 15.4% in Q1). By contrast, external demand made a negative con-
tribution to GDP in Q2 of 1.6 pp (+0.1 pp in Q1), due to the extraordinary moderation of 
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exports, especially mining exports, which is in response to both slowing demand and 
temporary supply problems. According to high frequency indicators there will only be a 
gradual slowdown that will foreseeably be mitigated by public spending and investment, 
owing to the implementation of the second economic stimulus package agreed in June 
which is equivalent to 0.4% of GDP (in order to boost investment and public spending, to 
extend welfare programmes, improve infrastructures and support exports). The current 
account deficit increased in Q2 to 2% of GDP, due to the strong decline in the trade sur-
plus (see Chart 13). The surplus on the financial account widened to 7.5% of GDP, as a 
result of higher long-term capital flows to the private sector. Inflation has shown a decreas-
ing trend over the year, resulting from the moderation in food and energy prices, although 
in September it stood at 3.7%, still above the upper limit of the central bank’s target inter-
val, affected by the rise in international food prices. The central bank held the official rate 
at 4.25%, unchanged since May 2011. Despite the complicated external environment, the 
new sol has appreciated by around 4% in the year, which would have been higher without 
the build-up of international reserves of more than $10 billion, an increase in the stock of 
more than 20%. Likewise, the central bank raised average reserves in national and foreign 
currency by 100 bp in order to moderate the inflow of short-term foreign capital and cred-
it growth, which over the year held on a decreasing trend, albeit at high rates (see Chart 
13). Turning to fiscal matters, the non-financial public sector achieved a surplus in Q2 
equivalent to 3.4% of GDP arising from the increase in current revenue which reflects 
buoyant domestic demand. The government envisages that the structural fiscal deficit will 
have been eliminated from 2013 onwards.
SOURCES: National sources and Fedesarrollo in Colombia.
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Venezuela’s economy showed a strong upswing in growth in 2012 Q1. GDP expanded by 
4.3% quarter-on-quarter and by 5.8% year-on-year and subsequently slowed to 5.4% 
year-on-year. Domestic demand grew 16.4% year-on-year in Q1 and 13.1% in Q2, due to 
the quickening of public and private consumption and, especially, investment. The contri-
bution of external demand to growth was highly negative (-14 pp in Q1 and -11.3 pp in Q2), 
owing to more buoyant imports — on account of the greater availability of foreign currency 
in the economy — and weak exports, which even fell in year-on-year terms in Q2. Inflation 
has gradually moderated over the year from 29% at end-2011 to 19% in September, al-
though the increase in the scarcity index compiled by the Central Bank of Venezuela 
seems to indicate the presence of some suppressed inflation (see Chart 13). Furthermore, 
in July government legislation came into force which aims to raise the amount of dollars in 
circulation in Venezuela; specifically in the parallel foreign exchange market (SITME), since 
it authorises certain agents to open accounts denominated in a foreign currency — ac-
counts which, in any event, would be settled in local currency at the official exchange rate 
— to which dollar reserves would be applied, and authorises export firms to trade 5% of 
their foreign-currency revenue in SITME. As for public finances, on central bank figures, 
2011 ended with a central government deficit of 3.4% of GDP, 0.1 pp down on 2010, on 
account of an increase in non-oil revenue of 3.2 pp of GDP, which financed a rise in current 
expenditure of 2.6 pp (essentially, higher debt service payments). Using other sources, 
such as ECLAC, the public sector deficit is estimated to have stood at around 6.5% of 
GDP in 2011, which, coupled with growing public debt (which has risen from 13.6% of 
GDP in 2008 to 35.5% in March 2012), raises doubts about the sustainability of public fi-
nances. The election year has also generated a sharp increase in expenditure (above 36% 
year-on-year in real terms in 2012 Q1). The current account surplus stood at 6% of GDP in 
Q2 in annualised terms and foreign direct investment amounted to 1.3% of GDP. After the 
presidential elections of 7 October which were won by the incumbent, the sovereign 
spread stabilised at around 900 bp.
15.10.2012.

